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Abstract
Background: Hospital governance increasingly combines management and professional self-governance. This
article maps the new emergent modes of control in a comparative perspective and aims to better understand the
relationship between medicine and management as hybrid and context-dependent. Theoretically, we critically
review approaches into the managerialism-professionalism relationship; methodologically, we expand cross-country
comparison towards the meso-level of organisations; and empirically, the focus is on processes and actors in a
range of European hospitals.
Methods: The research is explorative and was carried out as part of the FP7 COST action IS0903 Medicine and
Management, Working Group 2. Comprising seven European countries, the focus is on doctors and public hospitals.
We use a comparative case study design that primarily draws on expert information and document analysis as well
as other secondary sources.
Results: The findings reveal that managerial control is not simply an external force but increasingly integrated in
medical professionalism. These processes of change are relevant in all countries but shaped by organisational
settings, and therefore create different patterns of control: (1) ‘integrated’ control with high levels of coordination
and coherent patterns for cost and quality controls; (2) ‘partly integrated’ control with diversity of coordination on
hospital and department level and between cost and quality controls; and (3) ‘fragmented’ control with limited
coordination and gaps between quality control more strongly dominated by medicine, and cost control by
management.
Conclusions: Our comparison highlights how organisations matter and brings the crucial relevance of ‘coordination’
of medicine and management across the levels (hospital/department) and the substance (cost/quality-safety) of control
into perspective. Consequently, coordination may serve as a taxonomy of emergent modes of control, thus bringing
new directions for cost-efficient and quality-effective hospital governance into perspective.
Keywords: European Comparison, Hospital Governance, Doctors In Management, Professionalism, Cost And Quality
Management, Coordination Of Control Modes
Background
Hospital governance in European countries increasingly
builds on mixed forms of governing and combines man-
agement and professional self-governance, thereby crea-
ting new more ‘hybrid’ controls that are expected to
improve cost-efficiency and quality of services [1]. Cur-
rently, much of the research is concerned with the
instruments of governance, often assuming linear rela-
tionships between a new policy, its implementation and
the effects in practice. But overall, new policies aiming
at medical management do not deliver the desired re-
sults when implemented in practice. Conry et al. [2]
therefore conclude from their systematic review of hos-
pital interventions that more theory driven interventions
are needed in order to improve effective implemen-
tation. Here, our comparative study comes in and may
help us to explore the determinants of new emergent
forms of control.
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trol’ (or ‘clinical management’ more generally) that in-
cludes a wide range of bureaucratic measurements and
managerial tools, such as target setting and performance
indicators, and also interventions where doctors have
oversight, such as evidence-based guidelines and con-
tinuing professional development (CPD). The new emer-
gent modes of control on the level of organisations are
mapped in a cross-country comparative perspective, fo-
cusing on doctors as the target group of hospital govern-
ance and on costs and quality as the key areas of
managing medical performance.
The linkage between macro-level (countries) and
meso-level (organisations) governance through the lens
of country comparison is innovative for two reasons:
firstly, this makes it possible to move beyond a discourse
of ‘hybridisation’ of medicine and management and to
analyse how the context matters and secondly, how this
creates specific forms of control. This approach may
contribute to a ‘deepening’ of our understanding of com-
plex interventions into clinical management [3] and ex-
plore new directions for cost-efficient and quality-effective
hospital governance.
The concept of governance (as defined in the health
policy debate and governance literature) [4-8] may serve
as a helpful framework in which to re-locate theories
and research from the realms of the sociology of pro-
fessions and organisations as well as management stu-
dies. Placed in a broader policy context, we revise the
managerialism-professionalism relationships and intro-
duce a more flexible and integrative approach. Empirically,
we set the focus on processes and actors and contribute
new material on how to improve operational governance
in hospitals [7] and control modes [9] in a range of European
countries. Methodologically, we bring cross-country com-
parison to the meso-level of the organisation in a range of
European countries. This brings a novel perspective into
comparative research, because comparison traditionally
focuses on institutions on the macro-level and often uses
Anglo-American countries and/or National Health Service
(NHS) systems as examples [10].
The empirical background: opening the box of control in
hospitals
Over recent years, new managerial regimes were intro-
duced that subsequently provoked scholarly debate about
the outcomes, specifically in relation to the role of doctors
and professionalism, and whether the changes may bring
about risks or benefits for healthcare services and for pa-
tients [11-17]. Yet, the evidence is scattered and contro-
versial when it comes to the processes and organisational
settings that create new modes of controls.
For example, a study carried out in the United States
compares the leadership potential of doctors and ma-
nagers using the quality of services provided in different
hospitals as an indicator [18]. This study clearly con-
firms that doctors take over management positions, but
the evidence related to the leadership potential is far
from clear. An increase in managerial governance is also
confirmed by Reich [19] who draws on electronic patient
records and qualitative research from the US. According
to this author, the new patient records are a ‘disciplinary
technology’ that creates ‘disciplined doctors’ [19], p. 1021.
In a similar vein, Dixon-Woods et al. [20] discuss new
managerial governance tools as a threat to doctors and a
kind of negative sanction to be applied if doctors are not
able and willing to establish more effective self-governing
control, as highlighted by the scandals in the National
Health Service (NHS) in England.
Studies carried out in a range of European countries
reveal variation in the transformations of control, thus
drawing a more complex picture. To begin with, in the
German medical profession, managerial and professional
self-governing procedures are increasingly combined
[21]. These developments nurture the ‘rise of a new pro-
fessionalism’ that may be more inclusive [21], p. 221,
Table 10.11 but it also may embody opportunities for
doctors to transform and strategically use managerial
tools, like evidence-based clinical guidelines and quality
reports. Some specialties are better equipped than others
to utilise and integrate the new clinical management in
daily professional practices. Consequently, the govern-
ance changes may also impact in the occupational struc-
ture and rearrange the order and status of professional
groups [21].
In a similar vein, but arguing from a Spanish perspec-
tive, Sacristán et al. [22] highlight new connections be-
tween medicine and management that, in turn, provide
new chances for doctors to utilise management. As the
authors put it: ‘The evolution of the discipline and the
trend towards a tailored therapy suggest that health eco-
nomics is not the end of clinical freedom but the start of
it’ [22], p. 1; see also [23]. Tousijn [24], p. 529. in an Italian
case study, also found that doctors ‘create their own man-
agerial procedures’ rather ‘adapting’ or ‘modifying’ existing
managerial procedures or ‘circumventing them’.
Drawing on material from Norway, Martinussen and
Magnussen [17] add further evidence of variety of trans-
formations underway in healthcare. The authors con-
clude: ‘Our findings support the view that, rather than
managerialist values colonising the medical profession
through a process of hybridisation, there is heterogeneity
within the profession: some physician managers are adop-
ting management values and tools, whereas others remain
alienated from them’ [17,25,26]. A similar conclusion was
drawn from a literature research of entrepreneurship in
western hospitals. The authors identify ‘various responses’,
including among others, a ‘transformative attitude towards
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preneurial elements of healthcare [27,28].
A European study confirms a general trend towards
new connections between management and professional
self-governance that was described in single-country re-
search or secondary analysis and adds further empirical
evidence [9]. This study highlights that, ‘medicine and
management are “twin forces”, and as such indicative for
the new emergent controls’ [9], p. 722. What matters are
the balance and the ‘specific composition of the toolset
of controls’ [9], p. 723. Here, it seems to be important to
take the different levels of governance into account, be-
cause ‘publicly operated hospitals increasingly have a
meso-level governance structure that resembles that of a
private company’ and important decisions are increas-
ingly made on this level [7], p. 5.
In summary, existing research highlights important
changes in the modes of control, but no uniform pattern
of professionalism-managerialism relationships could be
identified. Instead, there is growing evidence of variety,
diversity and heterogeneity of the ways management and
professionalism are connected, including the design of
clinical management by doctors. This raises the ques-
tions what actually matters in creating new modes of
control, and what are the determinants that may foster
more efficient and integrated forms. Against the back-
drop of a lack of any clear empirical evidence of fa-
vourable conditions and the call for more theory-led
intervention strategy [2], the next section critically dis-
cusses how the scholarly theories may support our re-
search questions.
The theoretical background: the managerialism-
professionalism relationship revisited
The US sociologist Eliot Freidson [29] is perhaps the most
prominent author who theorised the relationship between
doctors/professionalism and management/bureaucratic re-
gulations from the perspective of the sociology of profes-
sions. Freidson has argued that professionalism acts as a
‘third logic’ next to rational-legal bureaucracy devel-
oped by Max Weber, which represents managerialism,
and ‘Adam’s model of the free market which represents
consumerism’ [29], p. 179.
The idea of a third logic is closely linked with the
assumption of ‘countervailing powers’ and ‘conflict’
between professionalism and managerialism [30,31].
Although these approaches were most influential in the
1990s, they are still stressed especially in Anglo-
American research. For instance, in their recent study
of the medical profession in England, Dixon-Woods
et al. argue: ‘The new rebalancing of the “countervailing
powers” has dislodged the profession as the senior part-
ner in the regulation of doctors, but may introduce
new risk’ [ 2 0 ] ,p .1 4 5 2 .
The countervailing powers approach embodies the
problems of dichotomy that cannot adequately grasp
more inclusive and mixed emergent models and that un-
derestimates the transformative capacities of profession-
alism [8,28]. Johnson [32] was among the first who
proposed to overcome the static and contradictory con-
ception of external regulation and professionalism by
taking up the Foucaudian concept of governmentality.
This approach opens up new perspectives directing our
attention toward social contexts and transformativity of
professionalism. It also has paved the way for concep-
tualising medical self-regulation as one part of a com-
plex set of governance [9,26,33-35], and consequently,
for more dynamic and reflective approaches.
Various authors from diverse (northern and continental
European) countries have highlighted important changes
underway in healthcare that create new forms of profes-
sionalism in order to better fit contemporary healthcare
needs, as discussed, for instance, by Plochg et al. [35], and
also in relation to empirical findings mentioned in the
previous section. Such new forms have been described
variably as: ‘hybridisation’ [36], p. 761 or ‘organized pro-
fessionalism…calling for multi-professional acts’ [37],
p. 1360. ‘diversity of professionalism’ and flexibility between
exclusionary and more ‘inclusive’ patterns [21], p. 221;
‘compatibility’ of different modes [28], p. 634 and ‘commu-
nity professionalism’ , as suggested by Tousijn [24], p. 533
with reference to Adler et al. [38]. Although the ‘labels’
differ, these approaches make much the same plea for
overcoming the managerialism-professionalism dichotomy.
A static conception of the professionalism-managerialism
relationship has also been questioned in organisational
research [39-41]. Here, one important focus is on the
‘blurring of boundaries’ between professionalism, con-
ceptualised as ‘internal’ mode of governing, and manager-
ialism as an ‘external’ governance approach attempting to
improve control and transparency of elitist professional
knowledge. Waring and Currie [42], in their study of the
management of knowledge around clinical risks in the
NHS in the United Kingdom suggest ‘that doctors respond
to change through a number of situated responses that
limit managerial control over knowledge and reinforce
claims to medical autonomy’ [42], p. 755. The authors use
three categories to describe doctors’ responses: ‘co-optation’ ,
‘adaptation’ and ‘circumvention’. The findings reveal how
‘management techniques are co-opted into professional
work as a form of resistance, with professionals being com-
petent in management practice, rather than being co-opted
into management roles’ [ 4 2 ] ,p .7 7 4 .
Cross-country comparative research has added strong
evidence of the variety of changing professionalism-
managerialism relationships. For example, Kirkpatrick and
colleagues [16], in their comparison of medicine and man-
agement in England and Denmark, highlight the ways
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sional development and ‘that processes of re-stratification
are more path dependent than is frequently acknowledged’
[6,16,33,34].
The merging processes between management and
medicine have primarily been studied from the perspec-
tive of doctors and changing modes of professionalism,
but the contemporary transformations do not travel on
a ‘one-way road’ from management to medicine [12,15,43].
Von Knorring et al. [44], in their qualitative study of
Swedish top managers, have revealed that top managers in
healthcare tend to remake existing hierarchies between
doctors and managers. In this study, the country council
chief executive officers often perceived the management
role in their organisations as weak. The authors could not
identify a clear strategy of managing doctors but, instead,
revealed four different strategies, and concluded that this
pragmatic behaviour may in a longer perspective lead to a
decrease in ‘the legitimacy of the manager role’ [44], p. 1.
One important explanation for the persisting hierarchies
might be the fact that managers cannot refer to a
formalised knowledge system in the same way as doctors
do [8,45].
In summary, the review of the literature reveals that
‘ownership’ of managerial tools is not naturally attached
to management and managers, but can be used flexibly
by different groups. Most importantly, there is no one
uniform pattern of transformations and not ‘a’ new pro-
fessionalism but various different ways of designing and
re-designing professionalism and the relationship with
organisations and management. This suggests a ‘need to
overcome the hegemony/resistance framework in current
analyses of the impact of management on professionalism’,
as recently claimed by Numerato et al. [28], p. 626.
To put it more generally: dichotomous concepts are
no longer sustainable. Instead, a more dynamic concep-
tual approach is needed that moves from the queries of
‘whether’ and ‘why’ the managerial-professionalism rela-
tionship is changing, towards the question ‘how’ this
happens. This approach pays greater recognition to the
contexts, the organisational settings and accountability
structures, and consequently, creates new methodo-
logical challenges of researching diverse and ‘hybrid’
designs and comparing healthcare systems across or-
ganisational setting.
The problems of dichotomies and pre-existing categor-
ies in theorising new emergent relationships between
medicine and management and their context-dependency
direct us back to the need for empirical investigations.
The major objectives to be addressed in this research
are: to describe new emergent forms of control beyond
the metaphor of hybridisation and to analyse context-
specific conditions that may foster more integrated clin-
ical management.
Methods
Research was carried out in the European network on Medi-
cine and Management (FP7 COST action ISA0903; http://
www.dr-in-mgmt.eu) and includes Denmark, Germany,
Greece, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal and Spain as coun-
try cases. As Burau [10], p. 569 highlights, more diverse
comparisons have created ‘a range of challenges related to
ensuring comparability, to comparing beyond the nation
state, and to finding appropriate data for comparison’.
Wrede [46] argues that case-based methods may help to
capture complexity and, furthermore, highlights the bene-
fits of interdisciplinary scholarship and methodological
reflexivity. One example of a case study method is the
so-called ‘decentred comparative research’ [47,48] that is
characterised by qualitative methodology and interpret-
ative analysis based on bottom-up developed categories
and by high levels of sensitivity to the contexts. This
approach seems to be useful also for the purpose of our
research, because it minimises the constraints of re-
search categories and theoretical bias, and therefore
provides most opportunity for exploring emergent
modes of control.
The conceptual model
The research design is a case-based comparison com-
prising hospital case studies from seven European coun-
tries, namely Denmark, Germany, Greece, Netherlands,
Poland, Portugal and Spain. These countries were se-
lected for two reasons: at first and foremost, they repre-
sent a range of different health systems and economic
and geopolitical conditions in Europe that made it pos-
sible to analyse both general trends and specific determi-
nants of new modes of control. The cases also reflect
existing expertise in the group of authors, and are there-
fore suitable for context-sensitive, qualitative case-based
comparison.
The hospitals selected for inclusion here have broadly
similar characteristics: they fall in the range of middle to
large hospitals that are primarily public, have imple-
mented a wide range of new managerial controls and, on
average, achieved high standards of quality of the ser-
vices provided when compared to other hospitals in the
country. This selection of cases allows us to explore
similarities and differences in the emergent patterns of
control in relation to organisational settings without los-
ing sight of national (macro-level) institutions. Figure 1
shows the conceptual model developed for our analysis.
We established an interdisciplinary research team
comprising wide-ranging expertise from health manage-
ment, economics and medicine to social and political
science as well as from the different countries and from
practice, research and policy. An interactive and reflec-
tive approach was applied both to the development of
instruments and the analysis of data in comparative
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half, and additional virtual discussion and comments
from additional experts in the field were organised, pro-
viding the opportunity for an in-depth discussion and
validation of indicators and findings. The major categor-
ies are summarised below and primarily include basic
analytical categories drawn from the governance litera-
ture (as described previously) and in addition, an empir-
ical category developed from our case study material.
Governance: serves as an umbrella concept including
different forms (hierarchy, market, network, and profes-
sional self-governance), different sets of managerial and
professional modes of governing, and institutions and
actors:
 Hierarchy: top-down exercised on levels of state
and/or hospitals.
 Market: all forms of competition; privatisation;
consumer/patient choice.
 Network: complex forms of governing with higher
levels of negotiations and more plural stakeholders
involved, including among others, corporatist-style
governance.
 Professional self-governance: the state has delegated
regulatory powers and responsibility for public
sector policy-making to professional associations.
Accountability structures: roughly described as ‘who
does what, reporting to whom’.
Coordination: serves as an empirical category, includ-
ing coordination across the levels of the hospital be-
tween top-down and bottom-up governing, and between
managerial-organisational and professional self-governing
procedures.
Research instruments and data collection
A Hospital Control Assessment Framework (H-CAF) [49]
was developed that served as guidance for the collection
of data in our different countries. The H-CAF is a
pioneering instrument, because no research exists that
brings cross-country comparison to the level of the or-
ganisation. It is based on a semi-structured, extensive
topic guide. Although the instrument is very detailed in
order to assure comparability between countries and in
an interdisciplinary group of authors, it is important to
note that it served as a qualitative tool. Data were col-
lected by the respective country experts in the group of
authors using different sources of information. However,
the assessment framework might serve as a pilot for de-
veloping a standardised questionnaire for surveying a
larger number of hospitals in future.
Drawing on the conceptual model outlined in Figure 1,
the H-CAF comprises the following five categories:
1. Key characteristics of the healthcare state and
institutional contexts of hospital governance
(macro-level);
2. Governance structures of the hospital
(meso-level/organisation);
3. Financial/efficiency controls and managerial tools
(organisational levels, accountability and actors);
4. Quality and safety controls and organisational-
managerial tools (organisational levels; accountability
and actors);
5. Professional/medical self-governing controls and
tools (organisational levels; accountability and
actors) [49].
A set of indicators was developed for each of the cat-
egories in order to specify the different tools of control
in hospitals and how they are applied. While category 1
focuses on the macro-level of healthcare states and cat-
egory 2 on the meso-level of organisations more gener-
ally, the remaining three categories seek to combine
actor-centred and organisational dimensions, asking
‘who is responsible’ and at ‘what level of the organisa-
tion’. In relation to existing instruments [5,50], the in-
novative momentum of this instrument is a comparative
analysis on the organisational level that, firstly, pays
greater attention to professional self-governance and the
connectedness between managerialism-professionalism,
and, secondly, to actor-centred governance and account-
ability structures.
In every country included in our study, one hospital
was selected as a case study following the criteria de-
fined above. The case studies were collected between
institutional contexts 
of hospital governance 
hospital/operational governance of costs and quality 
org.-managerial control            prof. self-governing control 
h hy yb br ri id di is sa at ti io on n
Figure 1 The conceptual model of researching control in hospitals.
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analysis and other secondary sources and expert infor-
mation in accordance with ethical guidelines of the
COST action and the respective national policies; ethics
approval for expert information is not required in any of
the countries where it has been included in this study.
A bottom-up approach and interpretative method-
ology were used to analyse the country cases. The find-
ings were discussed in an interactive workshop, as
already mentioned, firstly in relation to a single case
study and then in comparative perspective. The analysis
followed three main steps: (1) identifying common
trends across the case studies, (2) describing the new
emergent forms of control case by case and exploring
similar patterns, and (3) finally developing an analytical
category that helps to draw a comparative map of
control across the levels and the substance of govern-
ance. This complex analytical procedure helps to im-
prove both comparability and context-sensitivity. While
the small-scale empirical basis (one case study per coun-
try) facilitates a qualitative analysis, it also has a number
of limitations that are explained in more detail in the
conclusion section.
Results
The country case studies
Table 1 provides an overview of the institutional con-
texts and the key characteristics of operational govern-
ance on the level of the hospitals. This is further
explored in the case-by-case presentation by highlighting
processes and actors involved in control.
Table 1 Hospital governance in European countries
Countries Institutional contexts Hospital organisation Financial controls Managerial governance Medical self-governance
Denmark decentralised, network-
based governance
embedded in hierarchy;
little market & strong
patient involvement
troika structure (medical,
nursing, admin. directors)
at top level indicative of
all levels of management
mixed DRG system;
centralised framework
with some flexibility at
all levels
strong bottom-up controls
with integrated medical
power on all levels; e.g.
monitoring, quality reports,
patient safety
important, but strongly
integrated on all levels
(see managerial
governance)
Germany decentralised
corporatist-style
governance; weak
hierarchy & weak direct
patient involvement;
some market
troika structure at top
level with some flexibility;
little systematic
implementation at
department level &
strong medical power
mixed DRG system,
with some flexibility &
strong involvement of
doctor at all levels
mix of top-down & bottom-
up controls with integrated
medical power; high
flexibility of doctors on
department level
important on all levels,
but strongest at
department level;
integrated with some
flexibility of doctors, esp.
quality & safety
Greece hierarchy (some
decentralisation) with
market & corporatism;
lack of patient
involvement
appointed (Ministry)
director with multi-prof.
board, but lack of
coordination with lower
tiers; integration of
doctors highly flexible
no DRG system;
budget strongly
hierarchical with little
flexibility at
department level;
limited involvement of
doctors
strongly top-down at the
macro-level but limited
between levels; new
emergent quality controls
primarily controlled by
doctors
important and strongest
at the department level;
medical power separated
& strong in the area of
quality
Netherlands mix of corporatism,
hierarchy, market, with
decentralisation &
patient involvement;
increasing market with
strong insurers
partnership governance
between administration &
doctors with strong
medical power on all
levels
mixed DRG system;
some diversity,
increasingly moving
towards performance-
based cost controls
connected to benchmarks
& public control with
strong integrated medical
power; increasingly
demand-led
important in all areas;
strongly integrated, e.g.
education, new emergent
specialty of medical
management
Poland centralised corporatism
with some hierarchy &
market; weak patient
involvement
general director & co-
directors (medicine,
nursing, finance, logistics);
some flexibility & diversity
on the department level
DRG-based, some
involvement of
doctors but
increasingly stronger
hierarchy (centralised
& hospital level)
top-down integration of
doctors coexist with
separation; connection to
bottom-up controls is weak
& highly diverse at
department level
strong in clinical practice
but weaker in cost
controls; highly
dependent on the level &
subject; some voluntary
efforts, e.g. guidelines
Portugal hierarchy with
corporatised public
sector; some market,
little patient
involvement
troika structure at top
level with some flexibility;
little systematic
implementation at
department level; strong
medical power
DRG system with
strong involvement of
doctors; some
flexibility at all levels of
the organisation
some top down controls
but weak & poorly
connected with bottom-up
controls; lack of
transparency; highly diverse
strong & decentralised;
little compulsory
performance management
but voluntary efforts
Spain strong (regional)
hierarchy with
incomplete integration
of medical power; little
patient involvement;
increasing privatisation
troika structure relevant
on all levels; but double
structure of general &
‘doctors only’ boards
assures flexibility &
medical power
budget fixed by
regional authority with
some flexibility of
hospitals; strong
medical power at level
of departments
top-down with some
bottom-up controls; troika
structure expanding, but
quality mainly managed by
doctors; weak coordination
& flexibility
important, strongest in the
area of quality &
department level, e.g.
CPD, guidelines;
integration & separation
are combined strategically
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Within the context of strong public responsibility for
hospitals and strongly integrated and network-based
governance arrangements on the level of regional au-
thorities, a so-called ‘troika’ structure or ‘triumvirate’ is
established at the level of the organisation, comprising a
medical, nursing and administrative director. This struc-
ture is indicative for all levels of management. Strong
bottom-up controls with highly integrated medical
power and patient involvement serve as a blueprint for
all new modes of control and regulatory bodies. This
comprises both cost and quality management proce-
dures, examples of which are a mixed DRG system,
monitoring systems, quality reports, patient safety and
complaints management. In this situation, new modes of
control broaden both the inclusion of management into
medicine (‘hybridisation’) and complex, plural modes of
governance on all levels of the organisation. Organisa-
tional conditions are becoming increasingly relevant in
defining the modes of control. Consequently, account-
ability structures are complex and coherent and, this in
turn, limits the space for strategic action of doctors.
Germany
Decentralised, networked-based governance with strong
medical power, some hierarchy and market and relatively
weak (although increasing) patient involvement together
with a mix of public, third sector and commercial hos-
pitals provide the framework. A troika structure is
established on the level of the hospital, while manage-
ment arrangements at department levels show higher
flexibility and diversity. The organisation has introduced
a number of new managerial procedures that are more
centralised for cost control (DRG system) in relation to
quality and safety management with greater flexibility of
departments. This has led to divergent transformations:
top-down exercised governance may expand into medical
domains on hospital level, while at the level of depart-
ments doctors may design clinical management filling in a
regulatory gap that results from the absence of a com-
prehensive troika structure. New modes of performance
management are established, but accountability struc-
tures are not adequately adapted. This creates space for
strategic action of doctors as the most powerful group
in hospital governance.
Greece
Hierarchy (with some decentralisation) and market to-
gether with separated medical power and lack of patient
participation provide the institutional framework for
hospital governance. Hospitals are primarily public and
headed by a general director (appointed by the Ministry)
and a multi-professional board that includes doctors.
Budgets are fixed with little flexibility on the level of
departments and no performance-based elements. The
hospital shows a strong hierarchical management with
some elements of corporatist governance and market,
but an overall vacuum of both self-governing and man-
agerial controls exists below the top level. In this situ-
ation, new forms of quality control are implemented
top-down and primarily controlled by doctors, while
medical integration is weak in the area of cost controls.
The lack of performance management and compre-
hensive accountability structures combine to create
highly diverse patterns of control. Consequently, there
is an overall weak coordination between mixed ele-
ments of governance and strong medical power in the
area of quality.
Netherlands
A complex and diverse mix of network, hierarchy and
market with primarily public responsibility for hospitals,
patient participation and strong elements of professional
self-governance is relevant on all levels of governance.
This has created a dynamic landscape of cost and quality
management where professional self-regulatory powers
are strongly integrated (e.g. mixed DRG system with in-
creasingly relevant performance-based controls, medical
checklists, inclusion of management in medical curric-
ula) and, interestingly, a new specialty of medical man-
agement is emerging. Managerial procedures are
increasingly demand-led, for instance, the hospital must
set sound price and quality parameters to achieve effi-
cient agreements with insurers, and doctors, in turn,
must act within this framework and also respond to cit-
izens’ demands. This makes the organisation a key
arena of performance-based management procedures
that are highly integrated in a coherent structure of ac-
countability, thus reducing strategic action of a single
actor, like doctors.
Poland
Centralised governance with strong corporatism, some
market and weak patient involvement but primarily public
responsibility for hospital services set the scene for control
procedures. Centralised and organisational controls are
flexibly combined; for example, some centralised (state
level) rules apply for teaching hospitals and impact on
staffing levels and the skill-mix. Medical self-regulatory
procedures are important, but largely separated from
management, although there are signs of emergent cor-
poratist governance, like the establishment of a multi-
professional board of directors or external expert reports.
Hence, this structure currently lacks of coherence at the
level of departments. In this situation, centralised man-
agerial controls increasingly intervene in medical budgets,
thus reducing medical power, while organisational con-
trols are weaker and flexibility of doctors higher in the
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accountability structures are highly diverse and this cre-
ates uncertainty and variety of medicine and management
relationships.
Portugal
Hospital governance is characterised by hierarchy with
strong medical power across all levels of governance and
a corporatised public sector, increasing marketisation
but lacking citizen/patient involvement and more com-
plex forms of partnership governance. There are some
signs of more centralised control on the top level of the
hospital, composed of a troika structure, like the ap-
pointment of the hospital director and the establishment
of a DRG system. Yet these attempts remain largely dis-
connected from the lower levels of governance, where
control is poorly developed. Consequently, top-down in-
troduced managerial controls may meet with a strong
system of professional self-governance at the level of de-
partments. On the backdrop of weak state and patient
control of hospitals, the organisation is gaining signifi-
cance. In a situation of poorly established accountability
structures, the ability of doctors to use management
strategically is increasing on the level of departments
and in the area of quality management.
Spain
Strong decentralised (regional) hierarchy with structur-
ally integrated medical power, public responsibility for
hospitals with some privatisation and overall weak pa-
tient involvement provide the framework for hospital
governance. The hospital has established a troika struc-
ture that is relevant on all levels, but the general boards
coexist with ‘doctors only’ boards and create a double
structure of highly integrated, and at the same time, sep-
arated medical power. Fixed budgets have been intro-
duced top-down with some flexibility on department
levels. A wide range of new controls, including incen-
tivised Continuing Professional Development (CPD) and
performance measurements, have been established and
connected through macro-meso-micro level contrac-
tualisation. Medicine is expanding into management and
this is driven by both departmentalisation and the estab-
lishment of clinical management with doctors utilising
control bottom-up. The double structure of integration
and separation allows for high flexibility and strategic ac-
tion of doctors, but new emergent accountability struc-
tures may limit these options.
Discussion
Mapping the emergent forms of control in comparative
perspective
Across our case studies, a general trend towards mixed
forms of governing and more integrated modes of mana-
gerial and professional self-governing controls are con-
firmed and add further evidence to the scholarly debate
over changing hospital governance [1]. The empirical
findings support our theoretical argument for an end to
dichotomous concepts of contradicting logics of man-
agement and medicine/professionalism, highlighting that
‘a manager is sitting in the minds’–as we put it in our
metaphor – rather than exercising external control of
doctors. However, our case studies reveal high variations
in the ways control is exercised on the level of the hos-
pital and this points to the relevance of organisational
settings. Three different patterns of emergent controls
can be identified.
Pattern 1 ‘integrated control’: characterised by strong
integration, and complex and coherent coordination be-
tween medicine and management, as found in Denmark
and the Netherlands. Complex accountability structures
limit strategic action of doctors as well as ad-hoc
interest-driven hierarchical interventions of governments
and organisations. Here, transformations occur across
the areas of costs and quality-safety control, thus creat-
ing new forms of control in-between ‘management-
medicine’, as, for instance, the attempt to establish a new
speciality of medical management in the Netherlands
illustrates.
Pattern 2 ‘partly integrated control’: medical power is
strongly integrated in the modes of control, but coordin-
ation between control on the levels of the hospital and
the departments shows gaps and variations. This pattern
of control may show up as ‘double structure’ of inte-
grated and separated medical power, like in Spain, or as
limited/weak troika structure on the level of depart-
ments in Germany. In both cases, medical power is
constrained in the area of cost controls and on the top
level of hospital management, while quality and safety
controls provide higher flexibility and opportunities for
strategic action of doctors. More integrated patterns of
medicine and management are emerging, but transfor-
mations are diverse and uneven.
Pattern 3 ‘fragmented control’: integration of medicine
and management is limited and coordination overall
weak, as observed in Portugal, Poland and Greece. Al-
though there is some variation among these countries,
all show efforts towards improved coordination and inte-
gration. Characteristically, accountability structures are
diverse, but variation and flexibility are highest at de-
partment level. This pattern provides most opportunity
for strategic action of a single actor. In this situation
doctors are most powerful in the area of quality and in-
creasingly integrate new managerial tools, while develop-
ments on the top level and in the area of cost control
limit medical power and may instead support state or
hospital actors. There are some signs of integration of
management in medicine in the area of quality, but a
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Transformations are generally highly disparate and un-
even. This, in turn, may create uncertain and inefficient
modes of control in hospitals.
Finally, our mapping exercise brings the relevance of
coordination into perspective that makes it possible to
empirically define and specify the level of ‘integration’
between management and professionalism in vertical
(macro-level/state and hospital governance; top-level
and department level of the organisation) and horizontal
(costs and quality) directions.
Methodological considerations
There are also important limitations, since the study is ex-
plorative in nature and the empirical material is based on
the assessment of one hospital per country. First, we have
selected one type of hospital in European countries and
used a case study design to develop reliable instruments
and keep the dimensions of meso-level comparison man-
ageable. While this type of public hospital is important in
all countries included in our study, entrepreneurial forms,
privatisation and third sector involvement are gaining
ground and this creates an increasingly diverse landscape
of hospitals [1,27,41]. Second, we focused on doctors and
medical self-governance, but tasks and the composition of
skills are increasingly re-designed and nurses, especially,
are making inroads in clinical management [51-53].
Conclusions
This article has set out to map new emergent forms of
control in European hospitals in comparative perspec-
tive, with a particular focus on doctors and the changing
relationship between medicine and management that are
often described as hybridisation. We have argued the
need for theoretical and methodological revisions that
are better able to respond to contemporary trends to-
wards mixed forms of hospital governance and a flexible
use of managerial-organisational and professional self-
governing controls [50,53]. Against this backdrop we
have introduced a conceptual model building on a con-
tinuum of managerialism-professionalism controls, and
have developed an assessment framework [49] that
served to map new emergent forms of control in the
context of organisational settings, thereby expanding
cross-country comparison beyond governmental bodies.
One key conclusion drawn from our study in European
hospitals is that managerial control is not simply an exter-
nal force but, increasingly, is internalised ‘in the minds of
doctors’. This finding is also supported by recent state-
ments from representatives of hospital doctors that high-
light management as a new chance for doctors [54,55].
Other conclusions are that the changing relationships
of medicine and management play out differently and
that organisations increasingly matter in setting the
scene for new emergent controls [56]. Here, our research
is able to contribute new knowledge to an emergent de-
bate into medical leadership and governance innovation
[3,16,57-60] and to put ‘flesh to the bones’ of what is
commonly described as ‘hybridisation’ of medicine and
management. Three patterns are emerging:
 ‘Integrated’ control with coherent coordination
within the hospital and similar patterns for cost and
quality controls;
 ‘Partly integrated’ control with diversity of
coordination on hospital and department level and
some fragmentation of cost and quality controls; and
 ‘Fragmented’ control with uneven and limited
coordination within the hospital and a gap between
quality more strongly controlled by medicine, and
cost control by management.
The comparative approach and our empirical material
here highlight the crucial relevance of ‘coordination’ of
medicine and management across the levels (hospital/
department) and the substance (cost/quality-safety) of
governance. As an empirical category, ‘coordination’ is a
strong indicator of new modes of control that may serve
as taxonomy for future research in this area. Importantly,
this indicator is robust and reliable across healthcare sys-
tems in Europe. We therefore suggest a new taxonomy of
clinical management building on the question,‘how coor-
dinated are the new models of control in relation to the
levels and the substance of coordination?’
Our empirical findings challenge contemporary health-
care policies that are usually concerned with instruments
and outcome measurements and that too often rely on
single interventions and the management of costs. Here,
the research may highlight new avenues for hospital gov-
ernance that put greater attention towards structural im-
provement of organisational settings that foster coherent
modes of coordination of medicine and management.
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